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Green bonds, whose proceeds are used towards environmental-friendly projects, are still 
perceived as a relatively new financial instrument with the first Green bond being issued in 
2007. However, the market is growing rapidly worldwide since its debut with almost 700 Green 
bonds and approximately $200bn issued in 2020. 
Several authors have already conducted studies regarding Green bond premiums and 
pricing. They have focused their studies either on municipalities and corporations, like  
Flammer (2018), Baker et al. (2018), Tang and Zhang (2018), (Zerbib 2019) among others. 
In this work we manually collect information on a large set of Green bond issuers and 
examine specifically Corporate Green Bonds and, more importantly, the relationship between 
the Yield to Maturity (YTM) of a Green Bond and the Leverage ratio of its issuer. For this, we 
have used a database composed by 2,054 Green Bonds and 37,771 Conventional Bonds for 956 
unique issuers. 
First, the results suggest that Green bonds have a negative premium i.e., the YTM of a 
Green bond is lower than the YTM of a Conventional bond: on average, the mean YTM is                       
-0.971 basis points for Green Bonds. 
When we look exclusively at Green Bonds and by studying the relationship between the 
YTM and the Leverage ratio from the issuer, our results shows that the YTM will be lower with 
a higher Leverage ratio from the issuer (-0.0850 basis points), meaning if the issuer has several 
issued bonds with a higher leverage, the YTM of a Green bond will be lower. 
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As obrigações Verdes, cujos fundos serão usados em projetos sustentáveis para o 
ambiente, ainda são percecionadas como instrumentos financeiros recentes, com a primeira 
obrigação Verde emitida em 2007. No entanto, o mercado está a crescer de forma rápida a nível 
mundial, com quase 700 obrigações Verdes e aproximadamente $200 mil milhões emitidos em 
2020. 
Vários autores estudaram obrigações Verdes, desde o seu prémio ao preço. Outros autores 
focaram-se tanto em municípios como empresas, como podemos ver em Flammer (2018), 
Baker et al. (2018), Tang e Zhang (2018), (Zerbib 2019) entre outros. 
Neste trabalho recolhemos manualmente informação sobre um vasto conjunto de 
emitentes de obrigações Verdes e, mais importante, estudamos especificamente as obrigações 
Verdes empresariais e a relação da Yield to Maturity de uma obrigação Verde com o 
endividamento do emitente. Para isto, usámos uma base de dados com 2.054 obrigações Verdes 
e 37.771 obrigações Convencionais de 956 emitentes únicos. 
Os resultados sugerem que as obrigações Verdes têm um prémio negativo, a YTM de uma 
obrigação Verde é menor que a de uma obrigação Convencional: em média, a YTM média é        
-0,971 pontos percentuais menor numa obrigação Verde. 
Quando analisamos exclusivamente obrigações Verdes e ao estudar a YTM com o rácio 
de endividamento do emitente, os resultados mostram que a YTM de uma obrigação Verde será 
menor com um maior rácio de endividamento (-0,0850 pontos percentuais), significando que 
se um emitente tiver várias obrigações e com isso um maior rácio de endividamento, a YTM de 
uma obrigação Verde será menor. 
 
 
Palavras-Chave: obrigações verdes, rácio de endividamento, finanças sustentáveis, finanças 
climáticas, investimento socialmente responsável  
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Earth’s climate change is not something new, it has been happening since forever, but it 
is accelerating at a steady and dangerous pace since the increased human activity in mid-20th 
century and further rising at an unprecedented rate. There is scientific evidence on rapid climate 
change, with global temperatures rising, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, sea level rise, 
and others (NASA 2021). 
On December 2015 in Paris, at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 196 Parties adopted a legally 
binding international treaty on climate change, known as the Paris Agreement. The agreement’s 
main goal is to limit global warming between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius when compared to pre-
industrial levels. This was an historic agreement, as it made possible for several different 
countries to combine efforts in order to push back the rapid climate change. The agreement also 
claims that climate finance is needed as the projects to meet these demands require large-scale 
funding (UNFCCC 2016). 
In order to support the needed large-scale funding, it was created a new financial 
instrument that was seen as a financial innovation in the sustainable finance area, as they 
facilitate and enable sustainable investing: Green Bonds (Maltais and Nykvist 2020). 
According to Tang and Zhang (2018), Green bonds are fixed income instruments whose 
proceeds are directed to climate-related projects, such as renewable energy, green buildings, 
sustainable water management, among others. 
Both Flammer (2018) and Maltais and Nykvist (2020), confirmed not only that the use of 
proceeds must be directed to climate-friendly endeavours, but also that Green Bonds are not 
structurally different from a Conventional bond. Although the proceeds of the Green bonds are 
channelled into specific green projects, the bonds are backed by the issuer’s whole balance 
sheet, so it can provide additional guarantees to the investor (Tang and Zhang 2018). When 
issuing Green bonds, companies should certify them via third-party entities to make the 
issuance more credible and signal their commitment in the investment to both investors and the 
market. 
There is no formal definition of what a Green bond is, although some guidance is provided 
by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) in the Green Bonds Principles (GBP) 
where a voluntary process guideline for the issuance of Green Bonds exists with four core 
modules: use of proceeds; process for project evaluation and selection; management proceeds 
and reporting. All these modules are widely accepted by the market participants as this 
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promotes disclosure, transparency and reporting. The GBP also recommends external review 
from third-party entities. 
The Center for International Climate Research is one of the third-party entities that 
assesses independently the issuers of Green bonds by attributing to their issuance a rating based 
on the “greenness” of the bond. This rating is called the “Shades of Green” and it has a direct 
relationship to how well does that issued Green bond promotes a low-carbon climate future. 
Another concept of Green is provided by the Corporate Bonds Initiative (2018), where it 
“differs around the world. The Climate Bonds Initiative uses the Climate Bonds Taxonomy, 
which features eight categories: energy, buildings, transport, water, waste / pollution control, 
land use, industry and ICT”. 
When we first look at Green bonds they are not, in concept, structurally different from a 
Conventional bond. The only difference between Conventional and Green bonds is that the 
proceeds from Green bonds are committed to finance environmental and climate-friendly 
projects. These destinations can go from renewable energy, green buildings to pollution 
prevention and control, among others. 
The world’s first Green bond was issued in 2007 by the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
with an amount of 600€M and a maturity of 5 years (European Investment Bank 2021). 
After this issuance, the market continued to gradually expand. It was almost non-existent 
in 2013, with only $21.2bn issued, but increased to a grand total of $1,110.7bn at the end of 
2020. Green Bonds still represent a small share of the total fixed income market, as the total 
amount outstanding in the 2nd quarter of 2020 was $114tn across the world (Green Bonds 
represent approximately ~1% of total bond market) (SIFMA 2021).  
Regarding sovereign issuances, France issued its first Green Bond instrument in 2017 
while the United Kingdom is issuing its first instrument in 2021. We can see also an increase 
in the diversity of issuing countries and the number of issuances per country with a peak of 
1,045 bonds and 54 unique issuing countries in 2020. 
One of the main questions regarding Green bonds is if the proceeds-specific destination 
of Green bonds is sufficient to make them have different pricing from Conventional bonds. 
There have been some studies regarding this topic. For the secondary market, Hachenberg 
and Schiereck (2018) only found limited evidence that Green bonds are priced significant 
differently from Conventional bonds. Zerbib (2019), for the bonds issued between 2013 and 
2017, only found that for investment grade bonds there is a moderate premium for Green bonds 
when compared to ordinary ones. Regarding corporate bonds, Tang and Zhang (2018) 
documented a positive stock market reaction and a greater stock liquidity after the issuance and 
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announcement of Green bonds. Flammer (2018) not only confirmed a positive stock return but 
also finds evidence of improvements in both operating and environmental performances after 
the issuance of Green bonds. 
For Modigliani and Miller (1958), leverage is the exposure of assets to financial risk and 
the leverage ratio is the proportion of Debt over its Equity. Adding more debt to the current 
structure will imply higher interest payments over debt issuance and therefore a higher leverage 
ratio of the company. 
Our contribution to the already developed work in this field is to try to establish a 
relationship, if any, between the YTM of corporate Green Bond and the Leverage ratio of the 
issuer. With this, I intend to see if a corporate with a higher degree of leverage has a Green 
bond with a higher YTM for the investors when compared to a Conventional bond. 
For this we have extracted a database from Refinitiv Eikon for all the active Corporate 
Green and Conventional bonds from 30th April 2012 until 28th February of 2021. With this 
search I have obtained a total of 2,054 Green bonds and 37,771 Conventional bonds. For the 
issuer’s financial information, we have used not only Refinitiv Eikon but also recurred to the 
issuer’s Investor Relations pages on their websites and contacted them by e-mail when the 
previous options were not sufficient to retrieve the required data. 
Our findings establish a negative relation between the YTM of a bond and the bond being 
Green or not. The YTM is -0.971 basis points lower when compared to a Conventional bond. 
Our findings are small in economic terms and are also aligned to the ones in Flammer (2018), 
where there is a positive relation between these two factors with -0.019% between the yield at 
issue. Both findings state a close pricing between Green and Conventional bonds, consistent 
with Larcker and Watts (2019) findings for municipal bonds. By adding both a Green and 
Financial Sector dummy variables, the YTM of a bond will be lower if the bond is Green               
(-0.491 basis points) but with a positive relation if the issuer belongs to a Financial Sector 
(+1.247 basis points). When we study the Leverage ratio, the YTM will still be lower for a 
Green bond (-0.824 basis points) however with a higher Leverage ratio from the issuer, there 
will be a higher YTM but with a relatively low influence in economic terms (+0.0175 basis 
points). If we introduce both Financial Sector and Leverage Ratio variables, the YTM still has 
a negative premium if the issued bond is Green (-0.620 basis points) and will have a negative 
premium with a higher Leverage ratio (-0.0292 basis points) but there will be a positive 




As mentioned before, the aim of this thesis is to find any relationship between the YTM 
of a Green Bond and the Leverage of the issuer. The results show us that the YTM of a Green 
bond will be lower with a higher Leverage ratio of the issuer (-0.0850 basis points) but for a 
Conventional bond, it is the opposite: the YTM of a Conventional bond will be higher with a 
higher Leverage ratio from the issuer (+0.0233 basis points). When the Financial Sector dummy 
variable is added, the YTM of a Green bond will still be lower with a higher leverage from the 
issuer but if the issuer is operating in the Financial Sector, the YTM will be higher by 0.186 
basis points. For Conventional bonds, the issuer’s leverage ratio now has a negative effect on 
the bond YTM as it will decrease by -0.0288 basis points for a higher Leverage, however, the 
YTM will be higher if the issuer is in the Financial sector with a positive relation of +1.753 
basis points. 
Our humble contribution to the already studied subjects in the Green bond literature is 
the attempt to establish a relationship between the YTM of a Green bond and the issuer’s 
Leverage. 
Even though we found a negative relationship i.e., the YTM of a Green bond will be 
lower with a higher leverage ratio from its issuer (-0.0850 basis points), that is economically 
small, further research is required in order to confirm not only the trend but also the magnitude 
of this value. 
When analysing bond issuances from the same firm, by using a different estimation 
technique, that is adding firm fixed effects, the YTM of a Green bond will be -0.296 basis points 
lower when compared to a Conventional bond with the same characteristics, from the same 
issuer. 
By considering Leverage ratio and by only taking into account the top 50th percentile, 
with a Leverage ratio above 15.96957, the market does not value the issuance of a Green bond, 
as it is statistically irrelevant. However, for the bottom 50th percentile, there is now a premium 
for the YTM (-0.231 basis points) i.e., the market finds relevant that for a lower leverage issuer 
if the bond is Green or not. 
If we add another issuer-only characteristic, as the Financial Sector, the Green variable is 
not statistically relevant for any company with a higher Leverage Ratio, regardless of whether 
it operates or not within the Financial Sector. This is also true for issuers that have a Leverage 
ratio below the median value and are not in the Financial Sector. Our final remark is that there 
will be a premium of -0.280 basis points for issuers that operate in the Financial Sector and that 
have a low Leverage ratio i.e., if the issued bond is Green, it will have a lower YTM when 
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compared to a Conventional bond from the same issuer if all the other characteristics are the 
same. 
Everything discussed in the Introduction will be further detailed in the following sections. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
on Green Bonds and Relationship between Leverage and Cost of Debt. Section 3 describes the 
Data and Methodology used. Section 4 presents and analyses our results. Our work has its 
remarking conclusions in Section 5, while References and Appendix being presented in both 




2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Green bonds 
 
A Green bond is a fixed income financial instrument with the purpose of encouraging the 
financing of environmental-friendly projects, like renewable energy, whilst promoting social 
welfare (Tang and Zhang 2018) or climate-related sustainable activities (Fatica, Panzica and 
Rancan 2020), like sustainable water management.  
When issuing Green bonds, companies should certify them via third-party entities to 
make the issuance more credible and signal their commitment to the investment. If it is a first-
time issuance, companies may find the process costly, and the shareholders of the issuing firm 
should ask the benefits from that specific and more costly issuance (Tang and Zhang 2018). 
Curley (2014) affirms that issuing a Green bond reduces the debt financial expenses of a 
company. 
According to Tang and Zhang (2018), even if the proceeds are directed to green projects, 
not only those assets will back the issuance but also the full amount of the balance sheet of the 
issuer will.  
There is no formal definition of what a Green bond is. There is although some guidance 
offered in the Green Bonds Principles (GBP) by the International Capital Market Association 
(ICMA) where they define Green Bonds as “any type of bond instrument where the proceeds 
will be exclusively applied to finance or re-finance, in part or in full, new and/or existing 
eligible Green Projects and which are aligned with the four core components of the GBP”. A 
voluntary process guideline for issuing Green Bonds is also included in the GBP (ICMA 2018). 
Another concept of Green is provided by Corporate Bonds Initiative (2018), where it “differs 
around the world. The Climate Bonds Initiative uses the Climate Bonds Taxonomy, which 
features eight categories: energy, buildings, transport, water, waste / pollution control, land use, 
industry and ICT”. 
 
2.1.1. Green and Conventional Bonds – Are they Different? 
 
A Green bond, in concept, is not structurally different from a Conventional bond. The 
only difference is that the proceeds from Green bonds are committed to finance environmental 
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and climate-friendly projects such as renewable energy, green buildings, pollution prevention 
and control, among others (Flammer 2018).  
Are the proceeds specific destination sufficient to make Green bonds having different 
pricing from Conventional bonds?  
A particular number of contributions have already analysed this issue with mixed results 
depending on the time frame, samples, and the type of market, if primary or secondary. For the 
secondary market, Hachenberg and Schiereck (2018) only found limited evidence that Green 
bonds are priced significant differently from Conventional bonds. Zerbib (2019), for the bonds 
issued between 2013 and 2017, only found that for investment grade bonds there is a moderate 
premium of Green bonds when compared to ordinary ones. Although it is not in the scope of 
this work, there are two contrasting studies regarding U.S. Municipal bonds: On a large sample 
of municipal Bonds in U.S., Karpf Mandel (2018) registered a Green bond discount on the 
secondary market; in a contrasting direction, for the primary market, Green bonds are issued 
with a premium when compared with Conventional bonds (Baker, et al. 2018).  
Regarding corporate bonds, Tang and Zhang (2018) documented a positive stock market 
reaction and also a greater stock liquidity after the issuance and announcement of Green bonds. 
Flammer (2018) not only confirmed a positive stock return but also finds evidence of 
improvements in both operating and environmental performances after the issuance of Green 
bonds. 
Our contribution to the already developed work in this field is to try to establish a 
relationship, if any, between the yield to maturity of a corporate Green bond and the firm’s 
leverage ratio. 
 
2.1.2. Green Bond Market 
 
The world’s first Green bond in the market was issued in 2007 by the EIB with an amount 
of 600€M and a maturity of 5 years. It was labelled a Climate Awareness Bond (CAB) 
(European Investment Bank 2021). 
After this issuance, the market continued to expand, not only in issued amount, as shown 
in Figure 1 but also in the number of issuing countries and issuances per year as shown in Figure 
2. As we can see in Figure 1, the market was almost non-existent in 2013 with only $21.2bn 
issued to a grand total of $1,110.7bn in the end of 2020. Green Bonds still represent a small 
share of the total fixed income market as the total amount outstanding in the 2nd quarter of 2020 
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was approximatly $114tn across the world (Green Bonds represent approximately ~1% of total 
bond market) (SIFMA 2021). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Cumulative Issue Amount of Green Bonds. Source: Refinitiv Eikon 
We can also see an increase in the diversity of both issuing countries and the number of 
issued Green bonds in Figure 2. The blue bars represent the number of Green Bonds issued per 
year and the red line represents the number of unique issuing countries per year, peaking a total 
of 1,045 bonds and 54 different issuing countries in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic 
around the world. In the first 2 months of 2021, there were already issued 211 bonds by almost 
30 different countries. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Number of Issues and Countries per year. Source: Refinitiv Eikon 
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Regarding sovereign issuance, France issued its first Green Bond instrument in 2017 
while the United Kingdom (UK) is only launching its first sovereign Green bond in 2021 for a 
yet to decide amount. This move comes ahead of UK’s hosting the international climate summit 
in November, the COP26 (Financial Times 2021). 
The market has slowed the number of issuances and amount in 2020 but the Swedish 
bank Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) expects a turnaround in 2021 as investors and 
policymakers expect a recovery from COVID-19 pandemic originated crisis. SEB’s projections 
are that corporates and Governments will issue a total of $500bn regarding Green bonds in 
2021, about half of total issuance amount ($1.1tn issued amount since 2007 up until 2020) until 
the end of 2020 (Financial Times 2021). 
In the first half of 2020 it was issued over $250bn in green debt while in 2019 the total 
issued amount was around $341bn according to the Climate Bonds Initiative (Climate Bonds 
Initiative 2020). 
The types of issuers are also diversifying, ranging from Governments to Supranational 
Organizations, Banks, non-bank financial institutions, to Corporates. 
Although the market is already expanding, Deschryver and de Mariz (2020) suggest four 
pillars for further expansion: standardization of the issue by developing a Green bond 
framework, an improved transparency and disclosure of the issuance with a creation of a task-
force, distinguish the Green bond market from other green instruments alike such as transition 
bonds and easier mechanisms to invest in non-developed economies as they could prove to be 
a resourceful source for new issuances. 
Another issue identified that limits the expansion of the Green bond market is that Green 
bonds are mostly used to refinance already existing projects, limiting its own growth (Bongaerts 
and Schoenmaker 2019). Bongaerts and Schoenmaker (2019) make a proposal to try to mitigate 
this limitation, by splitting Green bonds into regular Green Bonds and Green Certificates. This 
will enable a higher disclosure on the prices of the instruments while allowing more liquidity 
and promoting investments in new climate-friendly projects instead of refinancing already 
existing ones. 
As mentioned before, there is still no formal definition of what a Green Bond is but there 




2.1.3. Green Bond Principles & Climate Bonds Initiative Guidance 
 
In 2014, a conglomerate of investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, 
HSBC, and others, created a guideline of voluntary best practices in the subject of Green Bonds 
issuance, called Green Bond Principles. Later, these principles transitioned to the supervision 
and development of an independent entity, the International Capital Markets Association who 
has issued the formal Green Bond Principles guide (Climate Bonds Initiative 2018). 
According to ICMA (2018), the Green Bond Principles are a set of recommendations and 
guidelines for the best practices in the Green Bond Market, with a special focus in disclosure, 
transparency, and reporting. By requiring that the issuers report on the use of the proceeds, it 
promotes the transparency in the process of issuing and labelling a Green bond, allowing the 
investors to have more trust in this financial instrument and enables the tracking of the funds 
and where the proceeds are allocated. 
Both United States and Europe are well represented in the executive committee with a 
minor participation from Asian countries. 
 
The GBP have four core modules that are widely accepted by the market participants: 
 
1- Use of proceeds 
The issuer when applying for the issuance of a Green Bond must provide a description 
for the use of the proceeds in the legal documentation that is required. The GBP provides a non-
exhaustive list of categories for eligible Green Projects which contribute to environmental 
objectives. This list, however, does not state which categories or projects have the most impact 
in climate change or which one is the best for environmental purposes, it serves only as a list 
for the issuer to choose where its project best fits in. 
 
2- Process for Project Evaluation and Selection 
Since transparency is one of the cornerstones of the GBP, the issuer of the Green Bond 
should clearly state the environmental sustainability objective, how did the issuer determined 
that the project was eligible in the proposed category, and the criteria for the project to be 
eligible and if applicable, any process that identified potential material environmental or social 




3- Management of Proceeds 
The net proceeds of the Green Bond should be segregated into a separate portfolio (ring-
fencing of proceeds). It is also recommended to disclose the intended type of temporary 
investments for unallocated proceeds. 
 
4- Reporting 
There are two types of reporting the issuer should provide: 
 
a) Use of proceeds reporting, where the information on projects benefiting from Green 
Bond allocations and reimbursements should be published on a yearly basis. 
b) Impact reporting, where the issuer should provide the expectations on the 
environmentally sustainable impact and incorporate qualitative and quantitative key 
performance indicators. 
GBP also recommends external review, such as verification, consultant review, 
certification, and rating. 
Following this required external review or second opinion there are some independent 
third-party entities that provide assessments in this area. 
The Center for International Climate Research (CICERO) Shades of Green is an 
independent company that provides assessments and shading, since 2015, to a company’s 
revenues and investments, specifically in the Green Bonds area. This is a rating that can be 
assigned to a green project according to its “greenness”, the so-called shades of green. These 
shades of green give information on how well a Green Bond promotes and is linked to a low-





Figure 3 - Shades of Green (CICERO 2015) 
Apart from ICMA with the GBP, Climate Bonds Initiative have also issued some 
guidance on the issuance of Green Bonds, with specific green taxonomy that features eight 
categories and also a ten sector criteria under the Climate Bonds Standard (CBS) that companies 
can assure in order for their bonds to be qualified as Green Bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative 
2019). 
Not only the issuers have to comply with the mentioned standard but they also must 
ensure that 95% of the proceeds must be allocated to green assets and projects aligned with 
CBS taxonomy (Climate Bonds Initiative 2018). 
 
2.2. Relationship between Leverage and Cost of Debt 
 
As seen in Modigliani and Miller (1958), leverage is the exposure of assets to financial 
risk and the leverage ratio is the proportion of Debt over its Equity. 
When companies do not use equity as the only source of financing i.e., they use debt, they 








The cost of debt, present in the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) formula in 
Equation 1, is the rate at which the proportion of Debt over the total value of the firm will be 








𝑟𝐷(1 − 𝑇) 
Equation 1 - WACC (Berk and DeMarzo 2017) 
Where E is the value of Equity, D is the value of Debt, rE is the Cost of Equity, rD is the 
Cost of Debt and T is the corporate tax rate. 
To compute rD, a company must use a rate of a risk-free bond that matches the duration 
of the term structure and then add a default premium (Berk and DeMarzo 2017). 
By introducing external debt into their balance, companies tend to have a lower cost of 
capital when compared to lower-levered companies or only equity-financed companies by 
using the tax benefits as the interest payments can be deducted. 
Adding even more debt to the current structure will imply higher interest payments over 
debt issuance and therefore a higher leverage ratio of the company. 
The default premium will also increase as more debt is issued and it is on the company 
capital structure, as the risk rises, the total cost of debt, rD, will increase as more debt exists in 
the company (Solomon 1963). 
A more extensive Literature Review regarding Capital Structure and Bond Theory can be 
found in the Appendix, in sections 7.1.1. and 7.1.2. respectively.  
 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
To create the datasets for this work, I have extracted both Green and Conventional bonds 
databases from Refinitiv Eikon “Government and Corporate” universe in the “Advanced 
Search” application. 
For the Green bond dataset, I have selected “Yes” in the already given field “Green Bond” 
from Refinitiv search parameters. The Green bonds in the dataset were defined by Refinitiv and 
validated in a partnership with Climate Bonds Initiative (Refinitiv 2020). 
With the abovementioned search I have obtained a total of 3,865 Green bonds from July 





For this work my focus will be the active Green bonds issued by corporates.  
Refinitiv provides a wide range of information for each issuance like the yield to maturity 
(which is the YTM to a given day, in this case, the date that I have extracted the information, 
28th of February), coupon rate, maturity date, issue date, tenor, issued amount in United States 
Dollars (USD) and in the issuer’s currency, coupon type, sector of activity, use of proceeds, 
among others. Besides not active bonds, I have also removed issuances that were already 
matured (maturity date prior to the extraction) but incorrectly stated as still active; bonds 
without the issuance amount; issuances without either coupon or yield to maturity. By applying 
these filters, I have obtained a total of 2,192 Corporate Green Bonds from April 2012 and 
February 2021. 
To compile the Conventional bonds dataset, I have selected all bonds from the issuers in 
the Green bond database from April 2012 and February 2021 where the search field “Green 
Bond” was “No”. This dataset is composed of 151,463 Conventional bonds. I have then applied 
the same database treatment procedure as the ones mentioned above. Again, I have removed 
observations that had already matured but that were listed as still active; that did not have either 
coupon, yield to maturity or the issuance amount, and got to a final Conventional Bond Dataset 
of 41,621 bonds. 
 
I have also gathered information about the issuing companies’ financials and further 
details. For this process I have used several methods and sources:  
1. I have used mainly Refinitiv Eikon “Equities” universe in the “Advanced 
Search” application, where it was possible to gather information regarding “Total Assets”, 
“Total Liabilities”, “Shareholders Equity”, “Debt-to-Equity” ratio and “Debt-to-Assets” ratio 
for 369 issuers; 
2. For the remaining companies that was not possible to retrieve information in an 
automatic process in Refinitiv Eikon, I have conducted an exhaustive and extensive manual 
search on the Internet, more precisely on companies’ websites, more specifically in their 
investor relations pages where I have retrieved the Annual Report, for a total of 139 companies; 
3. For some companies it was possible to retrieve Balance Sheet information from 
Refinitiv in a manual procedure, where I had to search each company individually, access the 
page and extract manually the Balance Sheet information for 423 companies; 
4. I have also contacted by e-mail one of the issuers to request financial information 
and it was provided by them. 
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After collecting all information for these companies, I have compiled the required 
financial information, company by company, in a different excel dataset. Even with this second 
method of search, it was not possible to retrieve financial information for 44 issuers in the 
database where I have removed them from both Green and Conventional Bond dataset.  
My final sample is then composed by 2,054 Green Bonds and 37,771 Conventional 
Bonds. I will use this final database from this point forward in my work. 
When dealing with large samples of data, it is usual to find extreme observations in it that 
would unbalance the analysis of the dataset. Winsor, in 1940, suggested to remove those 
observations of the dataset and balance them in a process called “winsorization”, named in his 
honour. Winsorizing the sample n times, means that we replace each of the n lowest and each 
of the n highest observations and replace them by their nearest neighbours (Dixon and Yuen 
1974). 
For this work, as there were extreme values in some variables like the YTM and Leverage 
ratio, I have winsorized those two variables by transforming the 5% values in each tail. As a 
reference, in Table 1 there is a comparison of those two variables and the mean value of each 
one, winsorized or not:  
Table 1 - Winsorized Variables mean values 
Variable Mean Winsorized Mean 
Yield to Maturity (YTM) 1,914.70 3.42 
Leverage ratio 16.80 13.95 
 
Table 2 shows the number of Corporate Bonds and the amount issued, in million US 
dollars, per year, since April 2012 until the end of February 2021 divided between Conventional 
and Green Bonds. 
As we can see from the table below, Green bonds still have a reduced expression in the 
fixed income market but nonetheless, they are on the rise, representing roughly 7% of total 
bonds (Conventional + Green) and with almost 200$bn issued in 2020. 
Despite the increase both in the number of Green bonds issuance and the issued amount 
since 2014, the average issuance amount has been decreasing since 2016, with an average of 
448$M issued per Green bond to an average of 283$M issued per Green bond in 2020. Even 
with the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was still the year with more issued Green bonds since its 
debut and with the highest amount ever issued nonetheless a drop of 10% when comparing the 




Table 2 - Corporate Bonds over time 
Year 
# Bonds Issued Amount ($M) 
Conventional Green Conventional Green 
     
2012 572 1 192,344 37 
2013 1,042 0 243,193 0 
2014 1,681 17 538,109 7,316 
2015 1,966 70 605,754 6,955 
2016 3,129 97 949,608 43,504 
2017 3,784 170 1,156,905 64,262 
2018 5,838 309 1,442,245 98,490 
2019 5,638 576 1,434,634 179,362 
2020 9,170 688 1,519,625 194,637 
2021 4,951 126 206,246 42,344 
     
Total 37,771 2,054 8,288,664 636,906 
 
 
Table 3 shows the number of Corporate Green Bonds and the amount issued, in million 
US dollars, per sector since April 2012 until the end of February 2021. Sector is shown 
according to the already existing data on Refinitiv Eikon database for the issuer. Financial and 
Banking sector is an aggregate of the following sectors: Banking, Financial – Other, Mortgage 
Banking, Life Insurance, Leasing, Property and Casualty Insurance. 
Not surprisingly, financial and banking companies account for over of 50% of the total 
amount issued of Green bonds. This is mainly true due to issuance of Green bonds by banks 
but also some companies have subsidiaries that are registered as financial companies and are 
used to issue this type of instruments on behalf of the parent companies. The utility sector is 
the second largest issuer mainly due to green projects that have become a natural investment 
path for the future in this sector with an example being the wind farms and solar panels 
investments. 
Companies within the Transportation sector, such as car manufacturers, might have an 
increase regarding issuance of Green bonds in the upcoming years as electric vehicles are on 
the rise and is a trend for the future. Those investments could be considered as eligible green 
projects by ICMA and their peers, allowing them to boost their investment in this area towards 




Table 3 - Corporate Green Bonds by Sector 
Sector # Bonds Issued Amount ($M) 
   
Financial and Banking 984 375,263 
Utility - Other 352 98,664 
Service - Other 111 29,616 
Transportation - Other 63 15,649 
Oil and Gas 27 15,101 
Home Builders 167 14,878 
Real Estate Investment Trust 82 14,367 
Electronics 28 13,384 
Industrials - Other 41 9,890 
Others 199 50,093 
   
Total 2,054 636,906 
 
Table 4 shows the number of Corporate Green Bonds and the amount issued, in million 
US dollars, per country of issuance since April 2012 until the end of February 2021.  
China, being the most polluting country in the world accounting for 27.2% of Global 
Emissions (World Economic Forum 2019), has the largest issued amount to mobilize capital at 
the scale needed to meet climate investment needs in the country. Despite the decrease in CO2 
emissions in 2019, mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic that started in the country 
(International Energy Agency 2020), the emissions in 2020 were already higher when compared 
to 2019. The increasing coal consumption is the main reason for the emission values to increase 
by an additional 6% in 2021 (International Energy Agency 2021).  
These high levels of CO2 consumptions will lead to an even larger gap between the 
issuing countries, as China is expected to issue, annually, between $424bn-$566bn from 2030 
going forward just in green investments. This level of investment will also help China to meet 
the Paris Agreement target for CO2 emissions reduction (Climate Bonds Initiative 2020). 
Being the second most polluting country in the world, responsible for 15% of all 
emissions (World Economic Forum 2019), the United States are the second highest country 
regarding the issuance amount. This position should be consolidated by environmental-friendly 
policies by the Biden administration as they favour the climate agenda. 
Netherlands is the third country regarding issued amount in Green bonds. This is true not 
only due to their investment in green projects and sustainability but also because some 
companies have their finance-specific subsidiaries based in the country, making it not possible 
to fully assess the investment levels of each country in a true and fair view. 
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Mexico, being the second most populated country in Latin America, is a key player 
regarding energy transition and reducing emissions in the area. The country could have an 
increase in green investments in the following years as Mexico City, the country’s capital, is 
one of the cities in the world with the highest impact by pollution mainly caused by 
transportation. To improve the levels of pollution and to have a better life quality in its capital, 
Mexico has an opportunity to drive this change by channelling investments towards Green 
bonds to transition their transportation sector to a low-carbon and sustainable sector (Climate 
Bonds Initiative 2021). 
 
Table 4 - Corporate Green Bonds by Country 
Country # Bonds Issued Amount ($M) 
   
China (Mainland) 491 118,392 
United States 179 80,803 
Netherlands 100 76,522 
France 74 40,431 
Germany 156 37,332 
Sweden 255 25,135 
Spain 34 21,121 
United Kingdom 40 19,097 
Japan 134 18,597 
Norway 56 17,975 
Others 535 181,501 
   
Total 2,054 636,906 
 
Table 5 shows the number of Corporate Green Bonds and the amount issued, in million 
US dollars, per Use of Proceeds since April 2012 until the end of February 2021. Use of 
Proceeds is shown according to the already existing data on Refinitiv Eikon database for the 
issue. 
The top use of proceeds, Eligible Green Projects, is a very wide and non-specific term for 
use of proceeds, and therefore it is not possible to take any conclusion from it.  
The next most selected use is Energy Efficiency, where windfarms and solar panel 
construction are amongst the destination of the issuance proceeds. 
As mentioned before, if Mexico pursues the investment strategy for improving their 
transportation system, the Clean Transport destination of proceeds could have an increase not 




Table 5 - Corporate Green Bonds by Use of Proceeds 
 
Use of Proceeds # Bonds Issued Amount ($M) 
   
Eligible Green Projects 969 329,174 
Energy Efficiency 406 140,927 
Clean Transport 174 67,595 
Alternative Energy 82 18,918 
Green Construction 76 14,354 
Acquisition 23 12,628 
Renewable Energy Projects 17 8,008 
Environmental Protection Projects 15 7,568 
General Purpose 65 6,727 
General Purpose/Refinance 6 5,198 
Others 221 25,809 
   
Total 2,054 636,906 
 
Table 6 shows the general Summary Statistics for the data collected, divided into Panel 
A for Bond Characteristics and Panel B for Issuer Characteristics, with panel A being split 
between Green and Conventional Bonds. Data is shown regarding the Mean, Median Standard 
Deviation, Minimum (Min), Maximum (Max) and N for the number of observations.  
In Panel A, regarding bonds, Amount is the issuance amount in million USD. Coupon is 
the value in percentage of the coupon of the bond. YTM is the value in percentage of the Yield 
to Maturity. Maturity is the value in years of the tenor of the bond. Callable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bond is callable. Putable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
Putable. Fixed Coupon is a dummy variable equal to one if the coupon bond is fixed. Perpetual 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is perpetual. 
In Panel B, regarding issuers, Leverage Ratio is the value of the proportion of debt over 
equity. Debt to Assets Ratio is the value of the proportion of debt over assets. Financial Sector 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer’s sector is financial (financial sector is an 
aggregate of the following sectors: Banking, Financial – Other, Mortgage Banking, Life 
Insurance, Leasing, Property and Casualty Insurance). 
By looking at Panel A we can see that Green Bonds have on average, a higher issuance 
amount ($310.08M for Green bonds vs. $219.45M for Conventional) although the highest 
issuance of Conventional bonds is almost six times higher than a Green bond ($25bn vs. 
$4,6bn), with a higher maturity than Conventional Bonds (9.92 years vs. 6.71). Conventional 
bonds on the other hand, have a higher coupon (3.10% vs. 2.76%) and YTM (3.47% vs. 2.50%). 
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Both Green and Conventional bonds coupons are predominantly fixed. There are a few number 
of bonds, either Green or Conventional, that are issued in perpetuity. 
Regarding issuers, in Panel B, they are mostly companies within the financial sector with 
a Leverage ratio of 5.64 on average. 
 
Table 6 - Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics           
Panel A. Bond characteristics           
    Mean Median Std. Deviation Min Max N 
Green Bonds        
Amount (million $) 310.08 154.74 395.84 0.01 4,642.17 2,054 
Coupon (percent) 2.76 2.38 2.20 -0.26 13.50 2,054 
YTM (percent)  2.50 1.74 2.75 -5.23 22.95 2,054 
Maturity (Year) 9.92 5.00 49.72 1.00 1,000.00 2,020 
Callable (0/1)  0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 2,054 
Putable (0/1)  0.08 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 2,054 
Fixed Coupon (0/1) 0.84 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 2,054 
Perpetual (0/1) 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 2,054 
        
Conventional Bonds       
Amount (million $) 219.45 24.15 625.41 0.00 25,000.00 37,771 
Coupon (percent) 3.10 1.46 4.89 -0.50 192.00 37,771 
YTM (percent)  3.47 1.05 6.53 -5.23 22.95 37,771 
Maturity (Year) 6.71 5.00 8.16 1.00 1,000.00 37,223 
Callable (0/1)  0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 37,771 
Putable (0/1)  0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 37,771 
Fixed Coupon (0/1) 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 37,771 
Perpetual (0/1) 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 37,771 
        
Panel B. Issuer characteristics           
    Mean Median Std. Deviation Min Max N 
        
Leverage Ratio 5.64 2.44 6.01 1.19 24.08 956 
Debt to Assets Ratio 0.73 0.70 0.15 0.54 0.96 956 








The first regression estimated is the following: 
 
𝑌𝑇𝑀 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +  𝜀𝑖 
Equation 2 - Regression 1 
 
In this regression, presented in Table 7, the YTM is the dependent variable. We consider 
three explanatory variables: Green, Financial Sector and Leverage Ratio. Green is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bond is Green. Financial Sector is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the issuer’s sector is financial (financial sector is an aggregate of the following sectors: 
Banking, Financial – Other, Mortgage Banking, Life Insurance, Leasing, Property and Casualty 
Insurance). Leverage Ratio is the value of the proportion of debt over equity.  
In column (1) the relationship examined is that between YTM and Green; in (2) between 
YTM and Green and Financial Sector; in (3) between YTM and Green and Leverage Ratio and 
in (4) between YTM and Green. Financial Sector and Leverage Ratio. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses and p values are as shown as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
If we just consider the “Greeness” of a bond, the results show us in (1) that the YTM of 
a Green bond has a negative premium, although small in economic terms, when compared to a 
Conventional bond i.e., the YTM will be -0.971 basis points lower if the issued bond is Green. 
In (2), the YTM of a bond will be lower if the bond is Green (-0.491 basis points) but 
there is a positive relation if the issuer belongs to a Financial Sector (+1.247 basis points). 
When we introduce the Leverage ratio, in (3), the YTM will still be lower for a Green 
bond (-0.824 basis points). With a higher Leverage ratio from the issuer, there will be a higher 
YTM but with a relatively low influence (+0.0175 basis points). 
Finally, in (4), by adding both Financial Sector and Leverage Ratio variables, the YTM 
still has a negative premium if the issued bond is Green (-0.620 basis points) and will have a 
negative premium with a higher Leverage ratio (-0.0292 basis points) but there will be a positive 







Table 7 – The YTM of Green Bonds with issuer Leverage and Sector effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  YTM YTM YTM YTM 
     
Green (0/1) -0.971*** -0.491*** -0.824*** -0.620*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0714) (0.0691) (0.0709)      
     
Financial Sector (0/1)  1.247***  1.551*** 
  (0.0589)  (0.0718) 
     
Leverage Ratio   0.0175*** -0.0292*** 
   (0.00285) (0.00350) 
     
Constant 3.471*** 2.393*** 3.220*** 2.551*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0484) (0.0383) (0.0470) 
N 39,825 39,825 39,825 39,825 
R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 
Root-mean-square Deviation 6.389 6.374 6.388 6.372 
 
For regression 2 the following equation is applied separately for green and conventional 
bonds: 
 
𝑌𝑇𝑀 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖 
Equation 3 - Regression 2 
 
Table 8 presents the regression for Green bonds in columns (1) and (2) and Conventional 
bonds in columns (3) and (4), where the YTM is the dependent variable.  
In columns (1) and (3) the relationship examined is between YTM and Leverage ratio and 
in columns (2) and (4) between YTM and the combination of both Leverage ratio and Financial 
Sector. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and p values are as shown as follows: 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The results show us that the YTM of a Green bond will be lower with a higher Leverage 
ratio of the issuer (-0.0850 basis points) but for a Conventional bond, it is the opposite: the 
YTM of a Conventional bond will be higher with a higher Leverage ratio from the issuer 
(+0.0233 basis points), meaning that there is a reaction from the market if the issuer has a higher 
leverage ratio depending on the issued instrument.  
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When the Financial Sector dummy variable is introduced in the regression, the YTM of 
a Green bond will still be lower with a higher leverage from the issuer but this variable is not 
statistically significant and therefore no conclusions can be made. For Conventional bonds, the 
issuer’s leverage ratio now has a negative effect on the bond YTM as it will decrease it by            
-0.0288 basis points for a higher Leverage. However, the YTM will be higher if the issuer is in 
the Financial sector with a positive relation of +1.753 basis points being this variable what will 
mainly drive the value of YTM in a Conventional bond. 
 
Table 8 – The YTM of Green and Conventional Bonds and the effect of Leverage ratio and 
Sector from the issuer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Green Bonds Conventional Bonds 
  Leverage 
Leverage & 
Financial S. Leverage 
Leverage & 
Financial S. 
Leverage ratio -0.0850*** -0.0918*** 0.0233*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.00972) (0.0123) (0.00294) (0.00366) 
     
Financial Sector (0/1)  0.186  1.753*** 
  (0.153)  (0.0788) 
     
Constant 3.008*** 2.960*** 3.136*** 2.372*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0837) (0.0386) (0.0496) 
N 2,054 2,054 37,771 37,771 
R-squared 0.042 0.043 0.001 0.006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.001 0.006 
Root-mean-square Deviation 2.696 2.696 6.527 6.508 
 
For regression 3 the following equation is applied, adding fixed firm effects: 
 
𝑌𝑇𝑀 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
Equation 4 - Regression 3 
 
Table 9 presents the regression where the YTM is the dependent variable and its 
interaction with the independent variable Green that is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
bond is Green.   
In this model, we include another estimation technique: firm fixed effects, i.e., we test if 
for the same issuer there is a premium regarding the YTM for the bond if it is Green or 
Conventional (αi). From the sample there were excluded 119 observations that only contained 
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either one Green or one Conventional bond issued. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and p values are as shown as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The results below show us that a bond will have a lower YTM if the issued instrument is 
a Green bond with -0.296 basis points when compared to a Conventional one. This means that 
the market finds relevant, if for the same issuer the bond issued is Green, as it will have a 
premium and therefore it will have a lower YTM when compared to a Conventional bond with 
similar characteristics from the same issuer. 
 
Table 9 – The YTM of Green Bonds with firm fixed effects 
  (1) 










Adjusted R-squared 0.369 
Root-mean-square Deviation 5.082 
 
 
For regression 4 the same equation is applied, but splitting the sample into high and low 
leverage firms: 
𝑌𝑇𝑀 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
Equation 5 - Regression 4 
 
Table 10 presents the regression where the YTM is the dependent variable and its 
relationship with the independent variable Green that is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
bond is Green. 
In this model, we include again firm fixed effects, i.e., we test if for the same issuer there 
is a premium regarding the YTM for the bond if it is Green or Conventional (αi). This regression 
is applied in column (1) to the firms that have a Leverage ratio greater than the 50th percentile 
(Leverage ratio > 15.96957) and in column (2) to firms in the bottom 50th percentile, where 
their Leverage ratio is below 15.96957. From the sample, there were excluded 119 observations 
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that only contained either one Green or one Conventional bond issued. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses and p values are as shown as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
The regression below shows us firstly that for companies with High Leverage i.e., with a 
Leverage Ratio above the median value of 15.96957, although the YTM will be lower if the 
issued bond is Green, this variable is not statistically relevant and secondly that for a higher 
Leverage ratio, above the median value, it is not relevant for the market if the issued bond is 
either Green or Conventional i.e., there is not a premium in the YTM associated with the 
issuance for two bonds from the same issuer, with similar characteristics. 
The regression for the Low Leverage firms i.e., with a leverage ratio in the bottom 50th 
percentile, it is now statistically relevant for the market if the bond is either Green or 
Conventional. The market will now consider a premium in the YTM of the issued bond, 
associated with the fact that it will be a Green bond. This YTM will be lower when compared 
to a Conventional bond, for the same issuer of -0.231 basis points. 
 
Table 10 – The YTM of Green Bonds for high leverage firms 






   
Green -0.530 -0,231*** 
 (0.387) (0,0868) 
   
Constant 4.248*** 2,211*** 
 (0.0402) (0,0226) 
   
N 23,820 15.886 
R-squared 0.369 0,345 
Adjusted R-squared 0.367 0,313 
Root-mean-square Deviation 6.161 2,607 
 
Table 11 presents several robustness exercises, always including firm fixed effects, i.e., 
we test if for the same issuer there is a premium regarding the YTM for the bond if it is Green 
or Conventional (αi). In columns (1) and (2), we show issuers that have a Leverage ratio above 
the median value of 15.96957 and in columns (3) and (4) issuers that have low Leverage, 
meaning that they are below the 50th percentile regarding Leverage ratio. For columns (1) and 
(3) we present issuers that are not operating in the Financial Sector and in columns (2) and (4), 
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issuers that do operate in the Financial Sector. Financial Sector is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the issuer’s sector is financial (financial sector is an aggregate of the following sectors: 
Banking, Financial – Other, Mortgage Banking, Life Insurance, Leasing, Property and Casualty 
Insurance).  
From the sample there were excluded 119 observations that only contained either one 
Green or one Conventional bond issued. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
p values are as shown as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The regression below shows us that in column (1), for companies that do not operate in 
the Financial Sector and have a high Leverage ratio, the market does not value those factors in 
a Green bond as this variable is not statistically significant and no premium is associated with 
the issuance. 
In column (2) we can see that this is also true but for companies that do operate in the 
Financial Sector and also have a high leverage, the market still does not find this relevant as the 
Green variable is again not statistically relevant. 
For companies that have a low leverage ratio, meaning that they are below the 50th 
percentile, and do not operate in the Financial Sector, the Green variable is again not statistically 
relevant making this irrelevant for the market and therefore they do not consider a premium for 
the issuance of Green bonds. 
Finally in column (4), where we analyse companies that are operating in the Financial 
Sector and have a low leverage ratio, below the median value of 15.96957, there is a premium 
associated in the issued bond if it is labelled as Green, being the YTM of the Green bond -0.280 
basis points lower than a Conventional bond issued by the same issuer with approximately the 
same characteristics. This issuance is now relevant for the market, as the Green variable is now 












Table 11 – The YTM of Green Bonds with different Leverages and sectors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 High Leverage Firms Low Leverage Firms 
  
Financial 
Sector = 0 
Financial 
Sector = 1 
Financial 
Sector = 0 
Financial 
Sector = 1 
     
Green -0.525 -0.530 -0.187 -0.280* 
 (0.00972) (0.0123) (0.00294) (0.00366) 
     
Constant 2.215*** 4.259*** 2.322*** 2.142*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0404) (0.0466) (0.0238) 
     
N 135 23,685 5,997 9,889 
R-squared 0.759 0.368 0.278 0.407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.367 0.228 0.384 






Our work added a new layer to the already existing studies by Flammer (2018), Baker et 
al. (2018), Tang and Zhang (2018), (Zerbib 2019) among others, as we introduced the Leverage 
ratio in the various analysis and regressions made. 
The first result that we may find in this thesis is that for the whole sample the YTM of a 
Green bond will be -0.971 basis points lower when compared to a Conventional bond. When 
we add the Financial Sector variable and the Leverage ratio into the analysis, the YTM will be 
-0.620 basis points lower if the bond is Green, +1.551 basis points if the issuer operates in the 
Financial Sector and -0.0292 basis points if the issuer has a higher Leverage ratio.  
When analysing exclusively Green bonds, the Leverage ratio will have an impact                
of -0.0918 basis points in the YTM while the Financial Sector variable is not statistically 
relevant in this sample. On the other hand, for Conventional bonds, Leverage ratio will decrease 
the YTM by -0.0288 basis points while if the issuer is operating in the Financial Sector, the 
YTM will be +1.753 basis points. 
By introducing the firm fixed effects estimation technique, the YTM will be -0.296 basis 
points lower if the bond is Green when comparing to another bond from the same issuer with 
approximately the same characteristics. 
Adding Leverage ratio and percentiles filtering to the above regression, the results show 
us that for a higher Leverage ratio (above the median value of 15.96957), the fact that the issued 
bond is Green it is not statistically relevant i.e., the market does not value if for the same issuer 
with a high leverage ratio the bond issued is Green or not. In opposite direction, when the 
issuer’s Leverage ratio is in the lower 50th percentile, there is now a premium (-0.231 basis 
points) for a bond issued by the same issuer with approximately the same characteristics. 
The results vary if we do the same estimations by segregating the sample by their sector. 
If the firm does not belong in the Financial Sector, the variable Green is not statistically relevant 
despite the Leverage ratio from the issuer. It is also not statistically relevant for the YTM of a 
bond if the issuer is in the Financial Sector and with a Leverage ratio above the median value. 
When the firm is in the Financial Sector and with a Leverage ratio in the lowest 50th percentile, 
the market values these factors and the YTM of a Green bond will have a premium of -0.280 
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7.1. Extended literature review 
 
7.1.1. Capital Structure 
 
A company’s capital structure should be the one that maximizes the value of the firm. 
When a firm needs to raise new funds, that can be done either by financing with its own capital 
(equity) or by borrowing money (debt). The company can finance itself with equity alone 
through owner’s equity, common stock, warrants, etc., or with a mixture of both equity and 
debt, through loans, bonds, or other financial instruments (Berk and DeMarzo 2017). 
Instruments that assume characteristics of both equity and debt are called hybrid 
securities like convertible debt or preferred stock (Damodaran 2014). 
The classical financial theory says that the investor should choose to maximize their 
investments with the portfolio that gives the highest expected return in a given time frame with 
a certain level of risk (Markowitz 1952). 
Later, Professors Modigliani and Miller (1958) concluded that the capital structure has 
no impact in the firm’s value.  
The two factors that could influence the value were income from operations and risk of 
the underlying assets and for that to happen, the market should also be in perfect conditions. 
The market can only be considered perfect if these conditions are met (Modigliani and 
Miller 1958): 
- The same set of securities can be traded by both investors and firms at competitive 
market prices equal to their present value of the future cash flows. 
- No taxes. 
- No transaction costs.  
- No bankruptcy costs 
- No issuance costs. 
- No agency costs. 
- The generated cash flows are not affected by the firms investing decisions. 
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This led to the Modigliani-Miller Proposition I: “In a perfect capital market, the total 
value of a firm’s securities is equal to the market value of the total cash flows generated by its 
assets and is not affected by its choice of capital structure”. 
 
7.1.1.1. Trade-Off Theory 
 
The Modigliani and Miller Theory was challenged later by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
with their trade-off theory regarding the optimal level of financial leverage. 
This theory also states that the capital structure of a firm is not relevant. It weighs the 
benefits of debt that result from shielding the cash flows from taxes against the costs of financial 
distress that comes with leverage. 
The total value of a levered firm equals the “value of the firm without leverage plus the 
present value of the tax savings from debt, less the present value of financial distress costs” 
(Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).  
 
 





7.1.1.2. Pecking Order Theory  
 
In 1984, Myers (1984) Capital Structure Puzzle paper introduced extra layers of analysis 
to previous capital structure and trade-off theory: Market asymmetry exists; there are financial 
distress costs alongside with agency issues regarding firm specific risks and financial structure 
information. 
The abovementioned sources of financing are now valued differently by managers and 
investors to what is called, the “pecking order”: 
1- Firms prefer internal funding. 
2- They would adapt their target dividends according to the investment opportunities that 
may arise 
3- External financing: 
a. Debt 
b. Hybrid securities such as convertible bonds  
c. Equity 
In this theory, there is no target debt-to-equity ratio since there are two types of equity, 
both internal and external (Myers 1984). 
There is also another pecking-order theory, from (Myers and Majluf 1984), called the 
issue-invest decision process where the firm’s managers have superior information: 
1- Safer securities are preferred over riskier ones. Bond markets should be the choice for 
external capital but raise equity by retention if possible. External financing by debt is 
better than issuing capital and financing through equity. 
2- When a firm’s investment opportunities surpass operational cash-flows and it has used 
up all their low-risk debt issuance ability, it is preferred to pursue this investment rather 
than proceed with riskier securities to finance the needs, in the interest of existing 
shareholders. 
3- When investment opportunities are not very demanding, firms can restrict their dividend 
pay-out to investors, generating some financial slack. The retained cash is held both as 
marketable securities or reserve borrowing power. 
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4- If the company has to sell some stock or risky securities in order to generated cash to 
payback dividends, they should not pay dividends. 
5- When managers have superior information and stock is issued to finance investments, 
stock price will fall, ceteris paribus. 
7.1.1.3. Leverage Ratio 
 
In a broader picture, companies decide to have leverage due to two benefits over equity: 
the tax benefit where interest payments on debt are tax-deductible and cash-flows originated 
from equity are not; and debt adds discipline to managers as they have to make debt payments, 
or the company can become bankrupt (Damodaran 2014).  







Equation 6 - Leverage Ratio 
7.1.2. Bond Theory 
 
As mentioned before companies can choose debt to finance themselves, specifically 
through fixed income securities. 
Fixed income securities are financial obligations that the issuer promises to pay a 
specified amount of money to the buyer at a specific date in the future. There are two fixed 
income securities categories: Debt Obligations and Preferred Stock. We will focus on debt 
obligations. 
In debt obligations, that can assume the form of a bond amongst other type of securities, 
the issuer is referred as the borrower and the investor who buys the security is called as the 
lender or creditor. The promised cash-flows from the issuer are both the interest (coupon 





Not only companies or firms can issue bonds. Supranational Organizations like the World 
Bank, Governments like German Government, Agencies like Freddie Mac, Municipalities like 
the State of Washington can also issue bonds just like firms (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2016) 
When a company issues bonds, it comes with several advantages: The first is that bonds 
usually have a more favourable financing structure and terms than equivalent bank debt, largely 
because the risk is split amongst a larger number of investors; the second is that bond issues 
might have some special features that the regular bank debt could not, for example, bonds can 
be convertible into common stock.  
When borrowing money and issuing bonds, the company has to make several choices 
with the issuance, namely the maturity of the bond (short term or long term); whether the debt 
should have fixed interest payments or an interest rate tied to market rates (fixed and floating 
rates) or even if it will be a zero-coupon bond where no interest is paid during the contract and 
is fully paid at maturity alongside with principal; the nature of the security offered to those 
buying the bonds (secured versus unsecured) and how the debt will be repaid over time 
(Damodaran 2014) (Fabozzi 2007). 
Bond maturities have influence in many aspects of the bonds: with long-term bonds, 
usually there is a higher interest rate associated. Also, prices of the long-term bonds are more 
sensitive to fluctuations rather than short-term ones. 
The interest rate that a company can issue a bond cannot be as low as the one in 
Government bonds, being the latter a benchmark for interest rates and the so-called risk-free 
interest rate. When these risk-free interest rates rise or decline, firm’s interest rates will adjust 
accordingly too proportionally. 
Since corporations have a higher default probability than Governments and less liquidity 
in their securities these two effects will have an impact in the spread between corporate bonds 
interest and Government bond interest rates (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2016). 
Nonetheless, bonds are considered a safe investment as creditors will get the money 
invested at maturity unless the company goes bankrupt.  
If the bond is kept until maturity, the investor knows exactly what the return will be at 
least on the face value of the bond, as the interest will depend if it is fixed or floating and the 
latter depends on three factors: inflation; market rate; and issuer credit rating.  
Credit rating is assessed by an independent third-party agency that evaluates how well 




7.1.2.1. Secured vs. Unsecured Bonds 
 
Bonds or other types of corporate debt obligations may be either secured or unsecured 
obligations. When we talk about Secured Debt this means that there is some collateral 
(properties, machinery, or other income stream) that will secure the payment of the debt. On 
the contrary, unsecured debt does not have that collateral pledge and therefore there are no 
guarantees on the payment of debt. 
With Secured Debt, the investor has the right to claim the issuer’s assets in event of 
default to try to recover his money back. Even with these pledged collaterals there is no 
guarantee that the investor will get his full investment back as the issuers ability to generate 
cash flows to payback its obligations may not be enough. 
When there are claims on a weak borrower, the value recovered is often below par. 
Even though Unsecured Debt or debenture bonds are not secured by a specific collateral, 
that does not mean that the investors have no claim in the issuer’s assets or earnings. They have 
the right to claim general assets that are not pledged to secured debt (Fabozzi 2007). 
 
7.1.2.2. Bond Ratings 
 
There is a direct relationship between default risk of the issuers and its bond ratings.  
Since it would be very difficult and inefficient for the individual investor to identify and 
evaluate every bond and company default risk, the safety of most corporate bonds is assessed 
by independent third-party firms like Moody’s; Standard and Poor’s (S&P); and Fitch. 
The ratings are split between two major categories: Investment Grade that range from 
AAA to BBB- (S&P rating notation) and Junk/Speculative Bonds/High-Yield Bonds (BB+ to 
D, in S&P rating notation).  
The bonds with the highest rating are the least likely ones to default. When investors 
check this information, they can easily assess the company creditworthiness and specifically of 
that bond; the risk of bankruptcy; the bondholder’s ability to lay claim to the firm’s assets in 






Figure 5 - Bond Rating Credit Table (Waring 2012) 
 
7.1.2.3. Bond Pricing 
 
An investor that owns a bond is entitled to a set of cash-flows until maturity (assuming 
that the bond is not a zero-coupon bond). Every year until the bond ends, the investor is entitled 
to collect regular interest payments (coupon). At maturity he will receive not only the final 
coupon payment but will also get back the face value, or principal, of the bond (Brealey, Myers 
and Allen 2016). 
The basic principle for valuing a bond is that the value must be equal to the present value 
of its expected cash-flows, where it is first needed to estimate the cash-flows; estimate the rates 
and then compute the estimated cash-flows using those rates (Fabozzi 2007). 
Since we are using a coupon bond as example, its price will be the present value of the 
coupon payments and the face value discounted at the competitive market rate: 
 

















Where P is Price, PV is Present Value, CF is the cash-flow (bond coupon payment), YTM 
is the yield to maturity of a zero-coupon bond with the same maturity as the coupon one, and 
FV is the face value of the bond. 
When the bond is traded at a price above the face value (FV) it is called premium; if it is 
traded at a lower price than FV it is traded at a discount and if it is traded at FV it is called that 
it is traded at par (Berk and DeMarzo 2017). 
 
7.1.2.4. Bond Yields 
 
When evaluating bond returns several yield measures could be computed as a percent 
return, rather than a dollar return like coupon rate: current yield, yield to maturity, yield to call, 
amongst others. We will focus only on Yield to Maturity. 
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the discount rate that the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
cash-flows of the project are equal to zero. If compared to zero-coupon bonds, it is called the 
Yield to Maturity: “The yield to maturity of a bond is the discount rate that sets the present 
value of the promised bond payments equal to the current market price of the bond” (Berk and 
DeMarzo 2017) 
This measure of yield is by far the most used in the bond market where the expected cash-
flows are determined and then the interest rate that will make the PV of the cash flows equal to 
the market price plus accrued interest. With this calculation we get the YTM of the bond, with 
the assumption that the bond is held to maturity. 
There is a relationship between Coupon Rate and YTM for when the bond is trading at 
par, with a discount or on a premium: 
 
Table 12A - Relationship between Coupon Rate and YTM, adapted from Fabozzi (2007) 
Bond Selling at: Relationship 
Par (P=FV) Coupon Rate = YTM 
Discount (P<FV) Coupon Rate < YTM 






















Where P is a given Price, CF is the cash flow (bond coupon payment), and FV is the face 
value of the bond (Fabozzi 2007). 
If the bond is a zero-coupon bond, its YTM would be the competitive market interest rate 




Table 13A presents the regression where the YTM is the dependent variable and its 
interaction with the other independent variables. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
Bond is Green. The rest of the variables are the country of issuance of a bond, in a total of 56 
unique countries. The R-Squared is 0.2962 and the Root-mean-square Deviation is 5.3664 for 
a total of 39,825 observations. 
Table 13A - Regression 7 by Country of Issuance 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
Green (0/1) -0.046 0.065 -0.700 0.482 -0.174 0.082 
Austria 0.172 0.102 1.690 0.092 -0.028 0.372 
Belgium 0.826 0.353 2.340 0.019 0.135 1.517 
Bermuda 4.168 0.074 55.990 0.000 4.022 4.314 
Brazil 2.417 0.208 11.610 0.000 2.009 2.825 
British Virgin Islands 1.268 0.107 11.870 0.000 1.059 1.478 
Canada 0.087 0.066 1.320 0.188 -0.042 0.216 
Cayman Islands 2.288 0.273 8.370 0.000 1.752 2.824 
Chile 0.791 0.159 4.960 0.000 0.479 1.104 
China (Mainland) 3.966 0.053 74.670 0.000 3.862 4.070 
Colombia 1.970 0.360 5.470 0.000 1.264 2.675 
Denmark 1.418 0.215 6.600 0.000 0.996 1.839 
Finland 1.421 0.295 4.820 0.000 0.843 1.998 
France 1.083 0.094 11.480 0.000 0.898 1.268 
Georgia 6.004 0.057 106.170 0.000 5.893 6.115 
Germany -0.126 0.041 -3.040 0.002 -0.207 -0.045 
Greece 2.025 0.799 2.540 0.011 0.460 3.591 
Guernsey 2.302 0.467 4.930 0.000 1.388 3.217 
Hong Kong 1.483 0.117 12.720 0.000 1.254 1.711 
Iceland 0.092 0.278 0.330 0.741 -0.453 0.637 
India 5.983 0.147 40.840 0.000 5.696 6.271 
Indonesia 5.044 0.244 20.660 0.000 4.565 5.522 
Ireland 1.243 0.282 4.400 0.000 0.689 1.796 
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Italy 0.046 0.077 0.600 0.546 -0.105 0.197 
Japan -0.252 0.041 -6.100 0.000 -0.332 -0.171 
Jersey -0.192 0.113 -1.700 0.089 -0.413 0.029 
Latvia -0.641 0.103 -6.220 0.000 -0.843 -0.439 
Lithuania -0.160 0.171 -0.930 0.350 -0.496 0.176 
Luxembourg 1.366 0.381 3.580 0.000 0.618 2.113 
Macau 0.522 0.245 2.130 0.033 0.042 1.002 
Malaysia 3.346 0.094 35.750 0.000 3.163 3.530 
Mauritius 3.256 0.135 24.120 0.000 2.991 3.521 
Mexico 3.780 0.140 26.960 0.000 3.505 4.055 
Namibia 5.540 0.785 7.060 0.000 4.001 7.079 
Netherlands 0.449 0.086 5.220 0.000 0.280 0.617 
New Zealand 0.862 0.234 3.680 0.000 0.402 1.321 
Nigeria 2.384 0.037 64.100 0.000 2.311 2.457 
Norway 0.069 0.066 1.040 0.296 -0.061 0.200 
Panama 2.825 0.243 11.610 0.000 2.348 3.302 
Peru 2.142 0.508 4.210 0.000 1.145 3.138 
Philippines 2.000 0.474 4.220 0.000 1.071 2.928 
Poland 0.260 0.233 1.120 0.264 -0.196 0.717 
Portugal 5.071 3.162 1.600 0.109 -1.126 11.268 
Russia 22.109 0.037 594.500 0.000 22.036 22.182 
Singapore 0.796 0.154 5.170 0.000 0.494 1.098 
Slovenia -0.719 0.048 -15.100 0.000 -0.812 -0.626 
South Africa 5.597 0.186 30.150 0.000 5.233 5.961 
South Korea 0.494 0.040 12.320 0.000 0.415 0.573 
Spain 0.167 0.113 1.480 0.140 -0.055 0.389 
Sweden 0.155 0.080 1.950 0.052 -0.001 0.311 
Switzerland -0.569 0.100 -5.700 0.000 -0.765 -0.374 
Taiwan 0.002 0.076 0.030 0.978 -0.147 0.152 
Thailand 1.458 0.192 7.600 0.000 1.082 1.834 
Turkey 7.593 0.910 8.340 0.000 5.810 9.377 
Utd Arab Emirates 1.193 0.148 8.060 0.000 0.903 1.483 
United Kingdom 8.784 0.112 78.130 0.000 8.564 9.004 
United States 1.457 0.080 18.190 0.000 1.300 1.614 
Constant 0.836 0.037 22.490 0.000 0.763 0.909 
 
Table 14A presents the regression where the YTM is the dependent variable and its 
interaction with the other independent variables. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
Bond is Green. Leverage Ratio is the value of the proportion of debt over equity. The rest of 
the variables are the country of issuance of a bond, in a total of 56 unique countries. The R-







Table 14A - Regression 8 with Leverage ratio by Country of Issuance 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
Green -0,112 0,064 -1,740 0,082 -0,238 0,014 
Leverage ratio -0,019 0,003 -5,440 0,000 -0,026 -0,012 
Austria 0,040 0,107 0,370 0,708 -0,170 0,251 
Belgium 0,828 0,343 2,410 0,016 0,156 1,500 
Bermuda 4,101 0,077 53,130 0,000 3,950 4,252 
Brazil 2,274 0,211 10,770 0,000 1,860 2,689 
British Virgin Islands 1,077 0,112 9,610 0,000 0,857 1,296 
Canada 0,185 0,067 2,760 0,006 0,053 0,316 
Cayman Islands 2,219 0,274 8,110 0,000 1,683 2,755 
Chile 0,718 0,155 4,620 0,000 0,413 1,022 
China (Mainland) 3,831 0,060 64,320 0,000 3,714 3,948 
Colombia 1,875 0,361 5,200 0,000 1,168 2,581 
Denmark 1,561 0,212 7,370 0,000 1,146 1,976 
Finland 1,458 0,295 4,950 0,000 0,880 2,036 
France 1,232 0,095 12,980 0,000 1,046 1,418 
Georgia 5,847 0,060 97,620 0,000 5,729 5,964 
Germany -0,016 0,046 -0,340 0,731 -0,106 0,075 
Greece 1,996 0,798 2,500 0,012 0,432 3,559 
Guernsey 2,510 0,468 5,360 0,000 1,593 3,428 
Hong Kong 1,320 0,121 10,920 0,000 1,083 1,557 
Iceland -0,120 0,280 -0,430 0,669 -0,669 0,429 
India 5,903 0,149 39,750 0,000 5,612 6,195 
Indonesia 4,848 0,243 19,980 0,000 4,372 5,323 
Ireland 1,062 0,283 3,750 0,000 0,507 1,617 
Italy 0,017 0,078 0,220 0,825 -0,136 0,170 
Japan -0,319 0,044 -7,270 0,000 -0,406 -0,233 
Jersey -0,389 0,115 -3,390 0,001 -0,614 -0,164 
Latvia -0,793 0,110 -7,220 0,000 -1,008 -0,578 
Lithuania -0,329 0,160 -2,060 0,039 -0,643 -0,016 
Luxembourg 1,400 0,379 3,690 0,000 0,656 2,143 
Macau 0,440 0,247 1,780 0,075 -0,045 0,925 
Malaysia 3,257 0,098 33,350 0,000 3,066 3,449 
Mauritius 3,133 0,138 22,700 0,000 2,862 3,403 
Mexico 3,660 0,147 24,840 0,000 3,371 3,949 
Namibia 5,444 0,785 6,930 0,000 3,905 6,983 
Netherlands 0,447 0,086 5,210 0,000 0,279 0,615 
New Zealand 0,712 0,238 2,990 0,003 0,245 1,178 
Nigeria 2,350 0,038 62,420 0,000 2,276 2,424 
Norway -0,018 0,068 -0,270 0,788 -0,151 0,115 
Panama 2,733 0,242 11,290 0,000 2,258 3,207 
Peru 2,056 0,560 3,670 0,000 0,959 3,153 
Philippines 1,909 0,470 4,060 0,000 0,988 2,831 
Poland 0,264 0,233 1,130 0,257 -0,193 0,721 
Portugal 4,924 3,147 1,560 0,118 -1,244 11,092 
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Russia 22,007 0,042 529,300 0,000 21,926 22,089 
Singapore 0,678 0,158 4,300 0,000 0,369 0,987 
Slovenia -0,838 0,050 -16,840 0,000 -0,935 -0,740 
South Africa 5,593 0,186 30,100 0,000 5,229 5,957 
South Korea 0,322 0,051 6,260 0,000 0,221 0,423 
Spain 0,214 0,114 1,880 0,060 -0,009 0,436 
Sweden 0,061 0,084 0,720 0,469 -0,104 0,226 
Switzerland -0,626 0,101 -6,180 0,000 -0,825 -0,428 
Taiwan -0,051 0,079 -0,640 0,520 -0,205 0,103 
Thailand 1,274 0,196 6,500 0,000 0,890 1,659 
Turkey 7,504 0,909 8,250 0,000 5,722 9,285 
Utd Arab Emirates 1,100 0,149 7,400 0,000 0,809 1,391 
United Kingdom 8,853 0,113 78,380 0,000 8,631 9,074 
United States 1,392 0,083 16,750 0,000 1,229 1,554 
Constant 1,077 0,058 18,630 0,000 0,964 1,190 
 
